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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, so-called rape shield laws date back to the 1970s. 
These laws limit the type of evidence a criminal defendant may introduce 
with respect to an alleged victim in criminal sexual conduct cases. The 
purpose of such laws is to afford criminal sexual conduct victims 
“heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary 
1
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invasions of privacy.”1 In 1974, Michigan became the first state to enact a 
rape shield law,2 followed in the same year by Iowa,3 Florida4 and 
California.5 By 1998,6 all fifty states and the federal government7 had some 
form of rape shield law on their books.8 Minnesota enacted its first version 
of a rape shield law in 1975.9 Since its enactment, Minnesota’s rape shield 
law10 has been amended several times and recodified.11 
In the years since they were enacted, many states’ rape shield laws have 
been challenged on several legal bases, most commonly as infringements of 
defendants’ rights under the Fifth12 and Sixth Amendments13 to the United 
States Constitution,14 which guarantee fair trials, the right to a complete 
                                                           
* J.D., Hamline University School of Law, 2012. Ms. Zauhar is an associate partner with 
Halberg Criminal Defense in Bloomington, Minnesota. She practices exclusively in the area 
of criminal defense. 
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1
 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991). 
2
 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520j (2019). 
3
 See IOWA R. EVID. 5.412. 
4
 See FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (2019). 
5
 See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(c)(2). 
6
 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–1421; UTAH R. EVID. 412 (Utah (1994) and Arizona (1998) 
were the last two states to enact rape shield laws). 
7
 FED. R. EVID. 412. 
8
 See Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and 
Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 121 (1999). 
9
 See 1975 Minn. Laws 1244. 
10
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2019); See also MINN. R. EVID. 412. 
11
 See State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied 
(Minn. Apr. 18, 1991) (holding the rape shield law was originally codified as Rule 404(c) in 
the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, however, effective January 1, 1990, the rule was amended 
and redesignated as Rule 412 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
13
 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”). 
14
 The mandates of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to the states through the 
incorporation doctrine and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Rabe 
v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315 (1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969); 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 
(1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 
(1965). 
2
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defense, and the right to confront adverse witnesses.15 Minnesota courts have 
long recognized the constitutional implications that invoking rape shield 
holds for a defendant charged with criminal sexual conduct.16 Yet, despite 
the courts’ acknowledgment of these constitutional pitfalls, they have 
consistently and overwhelmingly found that an alleged victim’s interest in 
shielding his or her previous sexual conduct outweighs a defendant’s 
constitutional right to present a complete defense and to confront adverse 
witnesses.17 In some cases, courts have allowed their approach in applying 
rape shield to slip beyond the boundaries of statutory language and, 
intentionally or not, expanded the scope of the law to include acts that would 
appear excluded by the plain language of the statute. Although the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has waded into the waters of rape shield a 
handful of times since the turn of the twenty-first century, it is apparent from 
lower courts’ decisions that application of rape shield has become no less 
muddied and one-sided than it was in the 1980s.18 In fact, over the last 
twenty-five years, Minnesota’s law has become more of a sword in the hands 
of prosecutors, hacking away at defendants’ ability to mount a defense, than 
a shield to protect alleged victims’ sexual history from scrutiny. 
This article will argue that, while rape shield laws serve a legitimate and 
important purpose in protecting victims from unnecessary and embarrassing 
disclosures, in the current climate of “#metoo” revelations and college 
tribunals that do not adhere to constitutional or evidentiary safeguards, it is 
more important than ever to ensure that defendants’ Fifth and Sixth 
                                                           
15 See Rabe, 405 U.S. at 315 (mandating the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to the states 
through the incorporation doctrine and the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); see also Benton, 395 U.S. at 787; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148; Washington, 388 
U.S. at 18; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405; David Haxton, Rape Shield 
Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 
1219 (1985). 
16 See State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (explaining that rape shield laws 
limit the admission of evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct and the right to present 
evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by rape shield laws). 
17 See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982) (stating that when determining 
whether to admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct, courts balance the state’s 
interest in guarding the victim’s privacy against the accused’s constitutional rights under rape 
shield laws). 
18 See State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306–07 (Minn. 2015) (“The State should not have 
introduced evidence indicating that A.F. was sexually inexperienced . . . and the district court 
abused its discretion by allowing it to do so. The rape-shield law applies equally to evidence 
offered by the prosecution and the defense [as per Minnesota Statutes section 609.347, 
subdiv. 3 (2019)].”); see, e.g., State v. Calbero, 785 P.2d 157, 161–62 (Haw. 1989); People 
v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 730–31 (Ill. 1990); State v. Gavigan, 330 N.W.2d 571, 576 
(Wis. 1983). 
3
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Amendment rights are preserved in criminal court proceedings. While the 
language of Minnesota’s rape shield law may pass constitutional muster, the 
consistent manner in which courts have applied rape shield to infringe on 
defendants’ due process and confrontation rights is constitutionally suspect. 
Moreover, courts appear to have expanded application of rape shield 
beyond the language of the statute itself and have yet to be meaningfully 
challenged for doing so.19 Thus, the time has come for either appellate 
courts or the Minnesota Legislature to examine the application of rape 
shield and offer more precise guidance to lower courts to ensure that 
defendants receive a fair trial, are afforded the opportunity to present a 
complete defense, and are given a meaningful opportunity to confront the 
witnesses against them. 
II. RAPE SHIELD IN MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT. § 609.347 AND 
MINN. R. EVID. 412 
Minnesota’s rape shield statute and corresponding rule of evidence 
provide, in pertinent part, that:  
In a prosecution under [statutes prohibiting criminal sexual 
conduct],20 evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct shall 
not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made 
in the presence of the jury, except by court order under the 
procedure provided in subdivision 4.21 The evidence can be 
admitted only if the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature 
and only in the circumstances set out in paragraphs (a)22 and (b)23. 
                                                           
19
 See State v. Lipe, No. A18-1985, 2019 WL 4745325 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019). 
When such a challenge has been presented, appellate courts have declined the invitation. 
See, e.g., id. (declining to address appellant’s challenge to construe the rape shield law as not 
applicable to subsequent sexual conduct). 
20
 See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342–609.3451, 609.3453, 609.365 (2019). 
21
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 4(a). “A motion shall be made by the accused at least 
three business days prior to trial, unless later for good cause shown, setting out with 
particularity the offer of proof of the evidence that the accused intends to offer, relative to 
the previous sexual conduct of the victim.” 
22
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(a)(i)-(ii). “When consent of the victim is a defense in the 
case, the following evidence is admissible: (i) evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct 
tending to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances 
similar to the case at issue. In order to find a common scheme or plan, the judge must find 
that the victim made prior allegations of sexual assault which were fabricated; and (ii) 
evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct with the accused.” 
23
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(b). “When the prosecution’s case includes evidence of 
semen, pregnancy, or disease at the time of the incident or, in the case of pregnancy, between 
4
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For the evidence to be admissible under paragraph (a), subsection 
(i), the judge must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the facts set out in the accused's offer of proof are true. For the 
evidence to be admissible under paragraph (a), subsection (ii) or 
paragraph (b), the judge must find that the evidence is sufficient 
to support a finding that the facts set out in the accused's offer of 
proof are true, as provided under Rule 901 of the Rules of 
Evidence.24 
Courts have characterized the Minnesota rape shield statute as 
“serv[ing] to emphasize the general irrelevance of a victim’s sexual history, 
not to remove relevant evidence from the jury’s consideration.”25 This 
description of rape shield is generous because it is an ideal characterization 
of how the law should work if it were applied consistently and with the 
appropriate counterbalancing of defendants’ constitutional rights. The 
idealistic depiction of rape shield in Wenthe and other cases fails to reflect 
how the law has been applied in Minnesota courts to the detriment of 
defendants.  
Rape shield “is not a law in the same sense as laws prohibiting theft [or 
other crimes].”26 Rather, it is a legislative limitation of a citizen’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses.27 To 
the extent that it hinders a defendant’s ability to mount a complete defense, 
rape shield also places a limitation on a defendant’s due process right to a 
fair trial.28 In spite of creating a law that courts have clearly recognized as a 
curtailment of a defendant’s constitutional rights, it is presumed that 
“[t]he legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United 
States or of [Minnesota].”29 Therefore, rather than simply striking down rape 
                                                           
the time of the incident and trial, evidence of specific instances of the victim’s previous sexual 
conduct is admissible solely to show the source of the semen, pregnancy, or disease.” 
24 See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2019); see also MINN. R. EVID. 412(1) (“In a 
prosecution for acts of criminal sexual conduct, including attempts or any act of criminal 
sexual predatory conduct, evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct shall not be 
admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the jury, except 
by court order under the procedure provided in rule 412. Such evidence can be admissible 
only if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory 
or prejudicial nature . . .”). 
25
 State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 
860, 867 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
26





 Id. at 627. 
29
 MINN. STAT. § 645.17(3) (2019). 
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shield as unconstitutional, courts have been forced to enunciate a balancing 
test that purports to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights in the face of 
rape shield. Citing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Friend, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals explained: 
In ruling on a defendant’s offer of [evidence that may be 
prohibited under rape shield], the trial court considers the 
defendant’s constitutional rights, Minn. R. Evid. 403 and 412, and 
the rape shield statute . . . . In the event of a conflict, the 
defendant’s constitutional rights require admission of evidence 
excluded by the rape shield law.30 
Although the Friend balancing test appears to hold paramount a 
defendant’s constitutional rights, it has been a rare case, indeed, in which a 
court of any level has found that either rape shield or Minnesota Rule of 
Evidence 403 has conflicted with such rights.31 Rule 403, which corresponds 
with the federal rule of the same number, provides:  
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.32 
Thus, even if evidence of an alleged victim’s conduct may otherwise be 
admissible under rape shield, a defendant must also overcome the burden 
of proving that such evidence is more probative than prejudicial before it 
can be introduced. Beyond proving the probative value of proffered 
evidence, a defendant bears the further burden of demonstrating that such 
evidence is truthful.33 The court of appeals offered the following explication 
in State v. Davis: “The Constitution will tolerate a rule or statute requiring 
the trial court to make a threshold finding of veracity as a predicate to the 
admission of a criminal defendant’s highly probative, but exceedingly 
prejudicial evidence.”34 Hence, under current Minnesota law: (1) evidence 
of an alleged victim’s previous sexual conduct must be more probative than 
prejudicial; (2) a court must find a defendant’s proffer of such evidence to 
be truthful; and (3) the evidence must fall within one of the recognized 
exceptions to rape shield.  
                                                           
30
 Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 866 (citing State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992)). 
31
 Carroll, 639 N.W.2d at 623. 
32
 MINN. R. EVID. 403.  
33
 State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Apr. 
18, 1991). 
34
 State v. Davis, 546 N.W.2d 30, 35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. May 21, 
1996). 
6
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In addition to those contained in the statute, several exceptions to rape 
shield have been carved out in caselaw: when exclusion of evidence would 
conflict with the defendant’s constitutional rights; exculpatory evidence 
when the defendant denies contact with the complainant; evidence of a 
complainant’s predisposition to fabricate charges; evidence of a source of a 
complainant’s sexual knowledge other than the defendant; or the evidence 
does not relate to “sexual conduct” due to the young age of the 
complainant.35 
III. EXCEPTIONS TO RAPE SHIELD 
A. Statutory Exceptions 
The rape shield statute contains a few enumerated exceptions to its 
own mandate that apply in very limited circumstances.36 In cases where 
consent of the victim is at issue, the defense may present “evidence of the 
victim’s previous sexual conduct tending to establish a common scheme or 
plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at 
issue, relevant and material to the issue of consent.”37 In order to prove a 
common scheme or plan existed under this exception, however, “the judge 
must find that the victim made prior allegations of sexual assault which were 
fabricated.”38 In other instances where the defendant alleges that the 
complainant consented, he or she may present “evidence of the victim’s 
previous sexual conduct with the accused.”39 
A final statutory exception exists in cases where the prosecution 
intends to introduce evidence of “semen, pregnancy, or disease.”40 In such 
cases, a defendant’s ability to introduce evidence to bolster his or her 
version of events is limited only to specific instances of the complainant’s 
previous sexual conduct that may offer alternative sources for the semen, a 
pregnancy that occurred between the time of the alleged incident and the 
trial, or a disease that was present at the time of the alleged offense.41  
Absent these enumerated exceptions, the mandate of rape shield 
appears absolute: “[E]vidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct shall 
                                                           
35
 See infra Part III. 
 
36
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2018). 
37
 MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(A)(i).  
38
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(a)(i) (2019). 
39
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(a)(ii); MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(A)(ii). 
40
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(b) (2019); MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(B). 
41
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(b); MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(B). 
7
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not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury.”42 As noted earlier, however, such an absolute 
limitation on a defendant’s ability to mount a complete defense or confront 
witnesses runs afoul of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.43 
Courts have, therefore, carved an exception to the law when rape shield 
conflicts with a defendant’s constitutional rights. 
B. Exclusion of Evidence Under Rape Shield Would Conflict With a 
Defendant’s Constitutional Rights 
A defendant’s due process rights and protections under the Sixth 
Amendment may require a court to admit evidence otherwise barred by 
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412 and Minnesota Statutes, section 609.347. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals explained as much in Carroll: “In certain 
cases the due process clause, the right to confront accusers, or the right to 
present evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by 
the rape shield law.”44 In such cases, then, despite the statute’s absolute 
language, the rape shield law must give way to a defendant’s rights. 
Although the broad mandate of the state’s rape shield law appears 
unyielding in its black letter form, Minnesota courts have held that: 
[e]very criminal defendant has a right to fundamental fairness and 
to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete 
defense. The Due Process Clauses of the Federal and Minnesota 
Constitutions require no less. The right to present a defense 
includes the opportunity to develop the defendant's version of the 
facts, so the jury may decide where the truth lies. The 
Confrontation Clauses of the Federal and Minnesota 
Constitutions serve the same purpose, affording a defendant the 
opportunity to advance his or her theory of the case by revealing 
an adverse witness's bias or disposition to lie.45 
Therefore, the scope of rape shield is, in fact, limited to the extent that 
it may conflict with the constitutional rights of a defendant in a criminal 
sexual conduct case. To this end, “Minnesota appellate courts have 
recognized that [evidence of an alleged victim’s previous sexual conduct] is 
                                                           
42 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3; see MINN. R. EVID. 412(1). 
43 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; see supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.  
44 State v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 627 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May 
15, 2002); see also State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (citing State v. 
Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1986)) (“In certain cases the due process clause, the 
right to confront accusers, or the right to present evidence will require admission of evidence 
otherwise excluded by the rape shield law.”) (emphasis added). 
45 State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Jan. 
23, 1996) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). 
8
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also admissible in all cases in which admission is constitutionally required 
by the defendant's right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or 
his right to offer evidence in his own defense.”46 
Given the numerous judicial statements regarding the importance of 
protecting a defendant’s constitutional rights and courts’ apparent 
willingness to eviscerate rape shield should it conflict with such rights, one 
struggles to see how rape shield has not been overturned as unconstitutional. 
Minnesota courts, however, see rape shield and the Constitution as existing 
harmoniously, even though the courts have acknowledged that “a rule that 
excludes material evidence for reasons of policy will, by definition, run afoul 
of defendants’ fundamental rights.”47 
The court of appeals explained this apparent contradiction thusly: 
“[W]e conclude the rape shield statute serves to emphasize the general 
irrelevance of a victim’s sexual history, not to remove relevant evidence 
from the jury’s consideration . . . . Viewed from this perspective, the statute’s 
relationship with the Constitution becomes one of harmony not tension.”48  
The court perceives harmony between rape shield and the 
Constitution “because it serves to remind the bench that the victim’s sexual 
history is normally irrelevant in a sexual assault prosecution.”49 The fact that 
a statute is a reminder for a concept of which judicial notice has already 
been taken seems an insufficient reason not to strike down a law that “by 
definition run[s] afoul of defendants’ fundamental rights.”50 
 The Crims court went on to state that “evidence of sexual activity 
with third persons cannot withstand a Rule 403 weighing unless special 
circumstances enhance its probative value.”51 Even in the absence of rape 
shield, then, unless a defendant can show that a “victim’s sexual history is 
relevant to the facts at bar,” it is a “form of character evidence that simply is 
not admissible under the normal rules of evidence.”52 The “special” 
circumstances identified by the Crims court include “situations in which the 
evidence explains a physical fact in issue at trial, suggests bias or ulterior 
motive, or establishes a pattern of behavior clearly similar to the conduct at 
issue.”53 
                                                           
46 State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 
27, 2013) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Benedict, 397 N.W.2d at341). 
47
 Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 867. 
48










 Id. (citing United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978)). 
9
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 Despite courts’ recognition of the potential for rape shield to conflict 
with the constitutional rights of defendants, they rarely, as will be argued 
later, find such conflict to exist.54 One of the few exceptions to rape shield 
regularly applied by courts, however, is when evidence of previous sexual 
conduct can exonerate a defendant who denies having had contact with the 
complainant.55 
C. Exculpatory Evidence When a Defendant Denies Contact With a 
Complainant 
In cases where an individual’s defense against criminal sexual conduct 
charges rests on the premise that the defendant did not have sexual conduct 
with the alleged victim, courts will allow evidence of the complainant’s 
sexual conduct to the extent that it excludes the defendant as a perpetrator 
of the offense.56 As the Minnesota Court of Appeals put it, “Where the 
defendant claims to have had no contact with the complainant, we do not 
think rule 404(c)(1) [now 412]57 was intended to bar the admission of 
evidence which is ‘directly relevant to negate the act with which the 
defendant is charged.’”58 Rather, according to the court, the goal of rape 
shield “is to limit evidence of the complainant's unrelated prior sexual 
conduct when consent is raised as a defense.”59 The exculpatory evidence 
exception applies even in cases where “[i]t is clear” that the evidence a 
defendant seeks to introduce is “not admissible under the limited 
exceptions” outlined in the language of the rape shield statute itself or Rule 
412.60 
In enunciating this exception to rape shield, the Hagen court cited to 
a Washington Court of Appeals opinion that held, essentially: 
[W]here the defendant denies any sexual contact with the victim, 
yet the post-rape medical tests show evidence of a recent sexual 
contact, then all recent sexual contacts which could account for 
                                                           
54
 Infra Part IV.  
55
 See infra Section II.C. 
 
56
 State v. Hagen, 391 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Oct. 
17, 1986). 
57
 MINN. R. EVID., 404(c) (renumbered to MINN. R. EVID. 412). See supra note 11. 
58
 Hagen, 391 N.W.2d at 891 (quoting Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 81 (Pa. 
1983)). 
59
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those testing results become highly relevant on the issue of 
defendant's responsibility for the crime.61 
The rationale for the exculpatory evidence exception was stated 
succinctly by a panel of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in a recent, 
unpublished opinion: “[T]he rape-shield law was not intended to bar the 
admission of exculpatory evidence of DNA testing of semen indicating that 
it was ‘most probably not’ [the defendant’s, and defendant] claimed that he 
had no contact with the complainant.”62 Similarly, the court of appeals has 
held that evidence establishing a complainant’s fabrication of charges may 
not be barred by the rape shield laws. 
D. Evidence of a Complainant’s Predisposition to Fabricate Charges 
As with evidence that exculpates a defendant when he or she denies 
having contact with an alleged victim, courts should admit evidence that 
tends to establish a complainant’s propensity to fabricate an allegation 
despite the broad prohibitions of Rule 412 and section 609.347. In 1989, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals opined that “evidence not fitting the two 
exceptions of Rule 404(c)63 nonetheless may be admissible under recent 
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions which recognized that the admission 
of certain evidence may be constitutionally required.”64 Thus, any evidence 
tending to establish a complainant’s predisposition to fabricate criminal 
sexual conduct charges should be admitted unless its potential for unfair 
prejudice outweighs its probative value.65 In addition, evidence about a 
complainant’s knowledge regarding sexual matters may also be admitted in 
spite of rape shield’s bar.66 
E. Evidence of a Complainant’s Source of Sexual Knowledge Other Than 
the Defendant 
In certain cases, the prosecution may allege that a complainant is so 
young or otherwise inexperienced that his or her source of sexual 
knowledge could only have come from the perpetrator of the offense or 
                                                           
61 Hagen, 391 N.W.2d at 892 (citing State v. Cosden, 568 P.2d 802, 806 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1977)). 
62
 State v. Morales, No. A15-0101, 2016 WL 456791, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 
2016), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2016). 
63
 MINN. R. EVID. 404(c) (renumbered to MINN. R. EVID. 412). See supra note 11. 
64
 State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Dec. 
20, 1989) (citing State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982)). 
65 Id.  
66
 Id. at 205. 
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offenses against the complainant.67 In such cases, a defendant should be 
permitted, despite the prohibition of rape shield, to introduce “[e]vidence 
tending to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual 
matters . . . in cases where the jury might otherwise infer that the defendant 
was the source.”68 This is because “sexual history evidence ‘establish[es] a 
source of knowledge or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances in 
which lack of knowledge is the likely inference to be drawn by the fact 
finder.’”69 
Recently, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court intimated that this 
particular rape shield exception is limited. In Wenthe, the court noted that 
“a complainant’s source of [sexual] knowledge becomes relevant only when 
the defendant asserts that the complainant fabricated the sexual conduct.”70  
Wenthe is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s most recent opinion 
addressing rape shield in any detail, and the court’s statement creates some 
overlap between the source of sexual knowledge and fabrication exceptions 
to the rule.71 The court initially recognized the exception related to an 
alleged victim’s propensity to fabricate charges in Caswell.72 Several year 
later in the Benedict decision, the court recognized the “sexual knowledge 
exception.”73 In its Kroshus74 opinion, the court of appeals appears to have 
continued its treatment of these exceptions as separate and distinct from 
one another. One could imagine a scenario in which a complainant’s source 
of sexual knowledge would be relevant even absent completely fabricated 
charges. For example, in cases where the complainant’s memory or ability 
to identify the defendant is in question, other evidence of his or her sexual 
knowledge may be relevant to demonstrate that the defendant was not the 
source of such knowledge.75 The question of sexual knowledge is one that 
often arises in cases involving minor alleged victims, as children presumably 
would not have the same level or type of sexual knowledge that an adult 
would.76 When examining the source of knowledge or “sexual” experience 
                                                           
67
 See, e.g., id. 
68
 Id. (citing State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1986)).  
69 State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 307 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding 
Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. 






 See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982). 
73
 See Benedict, 397 N.W.2d at 341. 
74
 State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
75
 See, e.g., State v. Woods, No. A10-1076, 2011 WL 2302105, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. June 
13, 2011). 
76
 See, e.g., Bean v. State, 432 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Jones, 43 N.E.3d 
833, 854 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
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in young complainants, it is important to examine whether the behavioral 
evidence a defendant is trying to introduce is sexual conduct per se.77 If such 
behavior is not sexual conduct, then it should not be barred by rape shield. 
F. The Evidence Does Not Relate to “Sexual Conduct” Due to the Young 
Age of the Complainant 
It is common for children to engage in anatomical exploration with 
themselves or other children. In fact, sexual exploration is a normal 
behavior for children under the age of ten.78 However, under the law, sexual 
intent is required before behavior can be deemed sexual in nature.79 
Minnesota law implies that children under the age of ten cannot form 
criminal intent— therefore, these children cannot engage in criminal sexual 
conduct under the law.80 This is presumably an extension of the common 
law defense of infancy, under which children were presumed unable to form 
the requisite intent to commit a crime.81 Because a child under ten cannot 
legally form sexual intent, childhood exploration cannot be called “sexual 
history” or the type of “sexual conduct” proscribed by the rape shield law. 
In Minnesota, courts have defined “sexual intent” with the phrase’s 
common usage: “[A]n act is committed with sexual intent when the actor 
perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual 
gratification.”82 Moreover, the need for establishing sexual intent in 
conjunction with the offense behavior is “to avoid criminalizing contact that 
is accidental or that serves an innocuous, non-sexual purpose.”83 Thus, 
establishing requisite sexual intent “negates the possibility of an innocent 
explanation such as accidental touching or touching in the course of 
caregiving.”84 
When a case involves a young complainant with a history of touching 
him or herself and/or other children, it would be difficult for the State to 
                                                           
77
 Jeanette R. Buttrey, Michigan's Rape-Shield Statute and the Admissibility of Evidence that 
A Child Complainant Has Been Previously Molested, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 391, 392–
93 (1998). 
78
 William N. Friedrich et al., Normative Sexual Behavior in Children: A Contemporary 
Sample, 101 PEDIATRICS 9 (1998). 
79
 State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Dec. 
14, 2010). 
80
 Cf. In re S.A.C., 529 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing the inability of 
minors under the age of ten to form criminal intent for the purposes of prosecution). 
81
 MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (2018).  
82
 Austin, 788 N.W.2d at 792. 
83
 Id. 
84 State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 691 (Minn. 2001). 
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demonstrate that such behavior was done out of “sexual desire or in pursuit 
of sexual gratification.”85 For this reason, sexual exploration or horseplay 
among children under the age of ten is simply not sufficient to “negate . . . 
the possibility of an innocent explanation.”86 In contrast, similar contact 
between an adult and a child would likely eliminate any possibility of an 
innocent explanation. Because a minor complainant cannot be legally 
capable of forming sexual intent,87 within the context of Minnesota’s 
criminal sexual conduct statutes, including rape shield, childhood sexual 
exploration cannot be considered “previous sexual conduct.”88 Thus, in 
cases where a minor complainant has a history of engaging in explorational 
sexual behavior that is similar to the offense conduct with which a defendant 
is later charged—for example, a child who initiated exploratory touching with 
other children and then attempted to engage in the same behavior with an 
adult—the complainant’s previous pattern of behavior should not be 
excluded by rape shield. 
IV. THE RAPE SHIELD LAW HAS BEEN APPLIED AND 
EXPANDED TO THE DETRIMENT OF DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
Despite the numerous exceptions to rape shield and the law’s already-
broad sweep, courts have rarely seen fit to favor a defendant’s constitutional 
rights over the rule’s evidentiary prohibitions.89 Moreover, in at least two 
opinions, appellate courts appear to have stretched the law’s proscription 
against evidence of “previous” sexual conduct to include evidence of 
subsequent sexual conduct.90 Prosecutors and courts have thus applied rape 
shield in manners that hobble a defendant’s constitutional right to present a 
complete defense. 
A. Courts Regularly Fail to Adequately Weigh a Defendant’s 
                                                           
85
 Austin, 788 N.W.2d at 792. 
86
 Vick, 632 N.W.2d at 691. 
87
 MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (2018). 
88
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018). 
89
 Helim Kathleen Chun & Lindsey Love, Rape, Sexual Assault, and Evidentiary Matters, 14 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 585, 593 (2013). 
90 See infra note 102. 
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As noted previously, a defendant’s constitutional rights must be 
considered when a court determines whether to bar evidence under the rape 
shield law.91  
In ruling on a defendant’s offer of [evidence that may be prohibited 
under rape shield], the trial court considers the defendant’s constitutional 
rights, Minn. R. Evid. 403 and 412, and the rape shield statute… In the 
event of a conflict, the defendant’s constitutional rights require admission 
of evidence excluded by the rape shield law.92 
And yet, among the more than 450 Minnesota cases citing section 
609.347 as of January 2020, the vast majority upheld application of rape 
shield—often in spite of lengthy discussions regarding a defendant’s rights to 
a fair trial under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.93 In the 
Minnesota appellate cases that address the constitutional rights of a 
defendant in the face of rape shield, courts have overwhelmingly decided 
against the defendant.94 Moreover, in cases where courts make only a passing 
mention of the need to address the rights of a defendant whose proffered 
evidence has been excluded by rape shield, the judges routinely rule in favor 
of exclusion and find no violation of either the United States or Minnesota 
Constitution.95 
Hundreds of Minnesota appellate cases that address rape shield have 
made apparent that courts are willing to dismiss defendants’ fundamental 
due process rights out-of-hand and exclude entire categories of evidence, 
solely because the proffered evidence is excluded by an arbitrarily-applied 
law that “by definition, run[s] afoul of defendants’ fundamental rights.”96 
The dearth of cases in which a defendant’s right to confront witnesses and 
present a complete defense was held to outweigh the application of rape 
shield makes this clear. On one rare occasion in which an appellate court 
reversed a district court’s application of rape shield because it violated a 
                                                           
91
 See supra Section III.B. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
92
 State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Friend, 493 
N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992)). See also State v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 627 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
93
 See, e.g., State v. Enger, 539 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
94
 See, e.g., State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306–07 (Minn. 2015); Crims, 540 N.W.2d 
at 866; Friend, 493 N.W.2d at 545. But see Carroll, 639 N.W.2d at 627 (reversing the lower 
court’s decision to allow the victim to use the rape shield laws to avoid cross-examination). 
95 See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, No. A17-0187, 2018 WL 4558151, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 24, 2018). 
96
 Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 867. 
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defendant’s right to present a complete defense,97 the decision was later 
reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that the lower 
court’s abuse of discretion in applying rape shield to exclude the evidence 
was harmless error.98 
B. Courts Have Applied Rape Shield Beyond the Plain Language of the 
Statute  
As noted previously,99 the plain language of the rape shield statute bars 
only “. . . evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct.”100 In no place 
does the statute’s language proscribing evidence refer to complainants’ 
conduct occurring after the alleged offense.101 Although no Minnesota 
appellate court has explicitly held that rape shield applies to subsequent 
conduct, at least two cases imply, in dicta, that courts may be willing to apply 
rape shield to subsequent conduct.102  Moreover, West Publishing’s “Notes 
of Decisions” affiliated with section 609.347 fuels this fire by including one 
of the two decisions under the editorial heading “subsequent sexual 
conduct.”103 
Yet, in the two decisions that may loosely be construed as having 
addressed subsequent sexual conduct, neither court directly referred to 
subsequent sexual conduct, nor was the issue raised by any party.104 In Olsen, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals examined the relevance of a clinic visit 
made by the complainant after the alleged offense conduct occurred.105 
Although it did so in the context of a rape shield ruling under section 
609.347, the court did not make a specific ruling on the applicability of the 
law to the clinic visit.106 In fact, neither the appellant nor the respondent 
addressed the issue of subsequent sexual conduct in their briefs.107 Without 
expressly holding as much, however, the appellate court’s eventual 
affirmation of the lower court’s evidentiary ruling implied that rape shield 
                                                           
97
 Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (“the district court abused its 
discretion in precluding appellant from introducing evidence of [the complainant]'s sexual 
history”), rev’d, 865 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 2015). 
98
 Id. at 308. 
99
 See supra section IV at ¶ 1. 
100
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018) (emphasis added). 
101
 Id.  
102
 See State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Crims, 540 
N.W.2d 860, 865–67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).  
103
 See MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2019). 
104 See Olsen, 824 N.W.2d at 340; Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865–67. 
105






Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol46/iss2/1
2020]                         MINNESOTA’S RAPE SHIELD LAW            321 
 
 321 
would apply to subsequent sexual conduct.108 In its holding, the Olsen court 
relied on Crims, a case that also appears to imply that evidence of a 
complainant’s subsequent sexual conduct is precluded by rape shield.109 
Similar to the Olsen panel, the court in Crims examined the relevance 
of the defendant’s proffered evidence and not a challenge to the timing of 
the complainant’s sexual conduct vis-à-vis the timing of the offense 
conduct.110 Nevertheless, the Crims opinion created an implication that rape 
shield could be applied to exclude evidence of prostitution that occurred 
after the time of the defendant’s alleged offense.111 Rather than ruling that 
such evidence was excluded by rape shield, the court held that, “[w]hen 
unconnected to a pattern of pre-existing behavior, such evidence is remote 
and uninstructive about the events underlying the rape charge.”112 Even so, 
Minnesota Statutes Annotated saw fit to include Crims in the “Notes of 
Decisions” regarding section 609.347’s applicability to “subsequent sexual 
conduct,” creating the dangerous potential for inference of a judicially-
created expansion of rape shield’s plain language.113 In at least one instance, 
without citing to any authority, a district court explicitly found that rape 
shield applies to subsequent sexual conduct.114  
However, applying rape shield to a complainant’s subsequent sexual 
conduct flies in the face of the statute’s clear wording. The statute’s plain 
language reads “previous”—not “subsequent” and not “prior.”115 “When a 
statute is completely silent on a contested issue, [courts] do not look beyond 
the statutory text to discern its meaning unless there is an ‘ambiguity of 
expression’ – rather than a failure of expression.”116 There is no ambiguity 
here; rather, absence of the word “subsequent” and the choice of the word 
“previous” is either a clear meaning or a failure of expression. 
                                                           
108
 Id. at 341.  
109
 Id. at 340.  
110
 See State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865–67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
111
 Id. at 867. 
112
 Id. at 869. 
113
 See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, note 10. 
114 See State v. Lipe, 10-CR-17-706 (Carver County) (Jun. 12, 2018), index no. 58, aff’d, No. 
A18-1985, 2019 WL 474532 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).In reaching its conclusions on 
the relevance of the evidence, the district court considered the rape shield statute and Rule 
412, concluding that the “Rule has been applied to prior and subsequent sexual contact.” It 
then found, without further reviewing the evidence or permitting further discovery, that the 
evidence was irrelevant under Rule 403. Id.  
115
 See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018); MINN. R. EVID. 412. 
116
 Toyota-Lift of Minn., Inc. v. Am. Warehouse Sys., LLC, 886 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Minn. 
2016) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d 524, 532 (Minn. 
2015) (quoting Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012))). 
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The legislature either saw fit to omit such language or overlooked it 
when drafting section 609.347, but it cannot be implied in the statute by the 
courts. A court “cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or 
inadvertently overlooks.”117 In fact, the interpretive canon expressio unius 
est exclusion alterius—“expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another”118—creates the presumption that the legislature’s omission of 
“subsequent” or “prior” was, indeed, “by deliberate choice, not 
inadvertence.”119 This presumption becomes even stronger “when, as in this 
case, a statute is uncommonly detailed and specific.”120  
The expressio unius canon applies to “associated groups and series . . 
. .”121 Here, section 609.347 does not define “previous sexual conduct” with 
respect to its prohibition in subdivision 3.122 However, later, in subdivision 
5, the same statute clearly differentiates between “previous” and 
“subsequent” sexual conduct when it prohibits certain jury instructions.123 
The plain language of the statute is unambiguous: “Previous” means 
previous—and not subsequent—to the relevant offense conduct. Thus, 
judicial application of rape shield to bar evidence of a complainant’s 
subsequent conduct is not only improper, it violates a defendant’s right to 
present evidence that is material and favorable to his or her theory of the 
case.124  
Even if use of the word “previous” in section 609.347 and Rule 412 is 
somehow ambiguous, the in pari materia canon sheds some light on what 
the legislature intended by its choice of the word previous.125 The in pari 
materia canon “allows two statutes with a common purpose and subject 
matter to be construed together to determine the meaning of ambiguous 
statutory language.”126 The purpose and “rationale for the canon is that 
related statutes, although separate, should be considered as one systematic 
body of law.”127  
                                                           
117
 State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Wallace v. Comm'r 
of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 230, 184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971)). 
118
 State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. 2017) (quoting State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 
373, 383 (Minn. 2011)). 
119
 Id. at 123 (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)). 
120
 Id. at 123–24. 
121
 Id. at 123. 
122
 See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018).  
123
 See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 5(b) (2018). 
124
 See State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (collecting cases). 
125
 State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017) (quoting State v. Lucas,  
589 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 1999)). 
126
 Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 437 (quoting Lucas, 589 N.W.2d at 94). 
127
 Id. at 437–38 (quoting State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 160, 21 N.W.2d 480, 486 
(1946)). 
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Minnesota Statutes, section 609.3455, like section 609.347, addresses 
criminal sexual conduct and is separated from the rape shield statute by only 
two short, interceding sections. Thus, “they share the necessary common 
purpose and subject matter for application of the in pari materia canon.”128 
The plain language of section 609.3455 provides that a “previous sex 
offense conviction” means that the “offender was convicted . . . before the 
commission of the present offense.”129 By analogy, “previous sexual 
conduct” would mean conduct which occurred “before the commission of 
the present offense.” In contrast, a “prior sex offense conviction” means 
conviction of a “sex offense before . . . [being] convicted of the present 
offense.”130 Had the legislature intended to exclude evidence of sexual 
conduct that occurred subsequent to the charged conduct within the 
meaning of section 609.347, it could have done so by using the word 
“subsequent” in addition to “previous,” or by using the word “prior” instead 
of “previous.” Yet, the legislature did no such thing. 
When the legislature’s intent is clear from the statutory language, 
statutory construction requires only a reading of the statute’s plain 
meaning.131 Application of the in pari materia and expressio unius canons 
dictates that the legislature’s use of the word “previous” and its plain 
meaning—“before commission of the present offense,”—is presumed to be 
by deliberate choice.132 Therefore, neither section 609.347 nor Rule 412 can 
be applied to exclude evidence of a complainant’s conduct that occurred 
after the date that an alleged offense was committed. Any inferences that 
may be drawn from Crims or Olsen regarding rape shield’s application to 
subsequent conduct must be disregarded, as neither case made such an 
explicit holding;133 and if they had, such holdings would have contradicted 
the clear language that the legislature used in crafting Minnesota’s rape 
shield law.134 
                                                           
128
 Id. at 438 (holding that theft and robbery share a common purpose and subject matter for 
application of the canon). 
129
 MINN. STAT. § 609.3455, subdiv. 1(f) (2018) (emphasis added). 
130
 MINN. STAT. § 609.3455, subdiv. 1(g) (2018) 
131
 State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. 2011). 
132 See State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 124 (Minn. 2017) (“the presence of a detailed and 
exhaustive list of ‘prior impaired driving conviction[s]’ creates a presumption that the 
omission of any criminal statutes, such as the criminal-vehicular-operation statute under 
which Smith was convicted in 2005, was due to deliberate choice, not inadvertence”). 
133
 State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 
134
 MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2018). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Rape shield laws clearly serve an important purpose in the legal system, 
and Minnesota’s version, codified in section 609.347 and rule 412, is no 
exception. Rape shield laws not only prevent irrelevant, prejudicial evidence 
from being considered by a jury, they also protect complainants’ reputations 
and safeguard them from victim-blaming. 
Courts have recognized, however, that rape shield laws represent a 
significant curtailment of a defendant’s constitutional rights to confront 
witnesses and to present a complete defense. For this reason, Minnesota 
courts have carved out exceptions to rape shield’s broad prohibitions. An 
exception that applies in every case is the need to balance the application of 
rape shield against a defendant’s constitutional rights. Although the need to 
do so is widely recognized, the balance very rarely falls in favor of the 
defendant’s rights. When rape shield is invoked, the evidence that 
prosecutors seek to ban is almost always excluded.  
In the climate of recent times, a simple accusation of criminal sexual 
conduct—with little or no evidence—can upend a defendant’s entire life. 
While the social movement favoring increased belief of accusations of 
sexual assault is undoubtedly important to societal growth, courts must 
remain neutral and reasoned in their application of the Constitution for the 
protection of accused persons against the immense powers of the 
government in criminal proceedings. Therefore, it is more important than 
ever for courts of law to consider the safeguards that the United States and 
Minnesota Constitutions offer criminal defendants. Due process is a 
guarantee, not an option. 
The manner in which rape shield has been applied to exclude evidence 
in Minnesota frequently appears to reflect an abundance of caution on the 
part of courts, perhaps from a desire not to upset prosecutors or 
complainants and their families, rather than a legitimate balancing of rape 
shield’s purpose against the interests of justice and defendants’ 
constitutional rights. Moreover, this overwhelming tendency among courts 
to favor rape shield’s proscriptions over a defendant’s constitutional rights 
has created the inference that rape shield may be applied beyond the plain 
language of section 609.347 and Rule 412. Instead of offering “heightened 
protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of 
privacy,”135 in Minnesota, rape shield has become a means for prosecutors 
to remove critical evidence in violation of the constitutional rights of 
defendants while courts stand by in complicity. 
                                                           
135
 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991). 
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